The Dogood Papers · Letters on Leadership
Letter No. II — The Politics of Fighting Back
Letters from the Republic
Part I — Schumer and Senate Leadership · Article 2 of 17
Opinion by Silas B. Dogood
Read with: Public Ledger — Letter No. II · Series Guide
Good citizens,
A government can remain open and still be badly governed. Closing it does not necessarily improve the situation.
This is an inconvenient beginning for anyone hoping to judge political courage by the volume of a speech or the duration of a shutdown. I propose a more demanding test: what did the strategy protect, what did it concede, and what capacity did it leave for the next confrontation?
Chuck Schumer's March 2025 funding decision deserves that examination. So do the later decisions that complicate the case against him.
The public is entitled to a record longer than a grievance.
The power available in March
On March 14, 2025, Schumer helped advance H.R. 1968 by voting for cloture. The motion passed 62–38. He then opposed final passage, which passed 54–46.1
The first vote mattered. Fifty-two Republicans supported cloture; the remaining ten affirmative votes came from nine Democrats and Angus King. Under the procedure used, Republicans needed at least eight of those ten. A sufficiently united Democratic caucus could have denied cloture. Schumer's individual vote, by itself, was not decisive.2
There was also a written alternative. Patty Murray and Rosa DeLauro proposed short-term funding through April 11, and Schumer endorsed that approach on March 12.3 It could have bought negotiating time. Its existence did not establish that the House, Senate, and president would accept it.
That is the difference between possessing bargaining power and knowing that its use will succeed. Leaders must make judgments under uncertainty. They should also explain how they prepared to use the power they possessed.
What the agreement produced
The March 14 floor arrangement allowed votes on three Democratic amendments concerning an IRS rescission, fired veteran federal employees, and DOGE funding. All failed. The main funding bill passed without amendment.4
The Senate separately passed a bipartisan repair for the District of Columbia's authority to spend its locally raised funds. That was a substantive initiative. It was not an enacted concession: the House did not take up S. 1077. D.C. subsequently used existing adjustment authority and revised its budget.5
We should give an attempted repair its proper place in the record without presenting it as a completed repair.
My criticism is that Democrats helped clear the main bill's procedural obstacle while their proposed changes remained outside it. A chance to lose an amendment vote can expose a disagreement. It provides rather less protection than language that becomes law.
The private negotiations deserve care, too. Murray and Susan Collins offered conflicting accounts of how earlier talks had failed.6 I cannot reconstruct every conversation from their public statements. I can inspect the agreement that emerged.
The catastrophe that did not occur
Schumer's defense was serious: he believed a shutdown would give Trump, Musk, and the administration's budget officials additional opportunities to damage government services and personnel.7
During a March 19 PBS interview that also discussed his new book, he described the hypothetical shutdown as fifteen or twenty times worse than accepting the bill.8
That is emphatic language. It is not a measurement with a denominator the public can inspect.
The possible harms of a shutdown deserved consideration. So did the risks of funding an administration already pursuing policies Democrats opposed. We cannot observe the shutdown that never happened, and later damage under continued funding cannot prove that shutting down would have produced a better outcome.
But an unobservable alternative must not become an unlimited defense of the observable decision. What safeguards were sought? Which were abandoned? What was the next point at which Democrats intended to insist on a different bargain?
In his March 14 CNN interview, Schumer said Democrats could move to areas where their position was stronger.9 That offered a strategy to examine after the immediate crisis. It did not settle the examination in advance.
The later record changes the argument
In November 2025, Schumer opposed both cloture and passage of the agreement reopening the government. He had sought a one-year extension of enhanced Affordable Care Act premium tax credits; the agreement omitted that demand.10
The eventual law did provide temporary protections against specified reductions in force, including restoration for affected employees. Those provisions were real, but the final deal passed over Schumer's opposition. They should not automatically be assigned to his personal negotiating credit.11
The promised later opportunity on health care did not secure the extension: the December 11 cloture vote on proceeding to S. 3385 failed 51–48.12
This episode disproves the claim that Schumer will never sustain a confrontation. It also demonstrates why willingness to fight and success in obtaining the principal demand must be evaluated separately.
There is stronger affirmative evidence in 2026. Schumer supported the funding agreement that became Public Law 119-103. Section 157 blocked the administration's specified federal-grant rule, or a substantially similar rule, through December 11.13
That was an enforceable, temporary restraint. Appropriators and other senators deserve their share of the credit. Murray's account also identified important protections Democrats had failed to obtain.14
I welcome that result. A criticism that cannot acknowledge an improvement has become a loyalty test of its own.
What a leader should explain
The record contains an unsatisfactory March bargain, a later confrontation that failed to obtain its central health-policy demand, and a subsequent agreement with a concrete but limited protection.
It supports a demanding inquiry into judgment. It does not support the slogan that Schumer never fights or never secures anything.
Before entrusting him with another majority, senators should ask him to explain his negotiating method. Which demands will he organize the caucus around before a deadline? What consequences will follow if an agreement is breached? When will he accept a partial gain, and what will he do with the time it purchases?
The same questions belong before his challenger. A promise to be tougher needs an account of how enough colleagues will be persuaded to act together, and how the people exposed to a confrontation will be protected.
My objection to Schumer's return includes the judgment displayed in March. The later record makes that objection more precise: I want leadership whose use of power is explained, tested, and corrected in public, with results that citizens can distinguish from announcements.
A press conference is an excellent place to describe a victory. The victory should preferably have occurred elsewhere first.
Yours in pursuit of consequential opposition,
Silas B. Dogood
I shall take the Republic seriously. Myself, somewhat less so.
Sources
Put into Circulation by a Citizen Activist.
Previous: Letter No. I · Series Guide · Next: Letter No. III
Footnotes
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U.S. Senate, March 14, 2025, roll call 128, cloture on H.R. 1968 and roll call 133, final passage. ↩
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The same cloture record; the eight-vote requirement is arithmetic from the recorded 52 Republican affirmative votes and the 60-vote threshold. ↩
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S. 924 text, introduced March 10; Schumer's March 12 remarks. ↩
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Congressional Record, March 14, 2025, amendments 1273, 1274, and 1272 and passage without amendment. ↩
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S. 1077, Senate-passed text; CRS, District of Columbia FY2025 Budget Status: In Brief, updated March 10, 2026, especially “Congressional Proposals” and “Local Budget Adjustments.” ↩
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Murray, March 14; Collins, March 14. These are participants' accounts. ↩
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PBS NewsHour, March 19, 2025 interview and transcript. The multiplier is his hypothetical characterization, not an empirical estimate. ↩
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Schumer's official transcript of his March 14 CNN interview. ↩
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Schumer's November 9, 2025 explanation; November 10 cloture, roll 617 and passage, roll 618. ↩
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Public Law 119-37, November 12, 2025, Division A §§106 and 120. The statute includes exceptions; it did not ban every possible dismissal. ↩
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U.S. Senate, December 11, 2025, roll call 644, cloture on the motion to proceed to S. 3385. ↩
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U.S. Senate, August 8, 2026, roll call 228; Public Law 119-103, signed September 2, Division A §157. ↩
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Murray's August 8, 2026 statement and summary, including unachieved impoundment and infrastructure protections. ↩
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